The Art of Flux Thinking

As this post is concerned with theoretical and practical work from other psychologists, I shall mention all the names I can that have been a contribution to my understanding of the concepts at hand. This is pretty much a regurgitation of what I have learned regarding Social Psychology theories on Leadership, with a personal critique at the end. As far as I am aware, I have not plagiarized the critique and the rest of the text is simply a regurgitation of others’ work, and their names will be mentioned at the end or during. Should the issue of plagiarism arise in the reading of the critique, let me know, for sometimes it is possible that two people can think the same thing without ever having come into contact with one another, or with each other’s work. A classic controversial example is the Newton & Leibniz story, which is still debated to this day about who was the pioneer of differential calculus, and who was the thief. Digression aside, now back to the issue at hand; before we commence, much thanks to my course Lecturer (R.T. Smith) for her extensive help and inspiration in the subject - as well as for her notes =).

Considerable work has been put into Psychology (Social in particular) regarding leadership, and nearly all the work I have come across considers the individualist perspectives, through trait and personality theories, or the collectivist approaches regarding group dynamics (e.g. status) between group elements. Both have their strengths and weaknesses, but the explanatory weight on this scale hangs heavy on the side of the group dynamics.

The Individualist Perspective

In the individualist approach there is a distinction drawn between apparent leaders and non-leaders. After forming this distinction the sensible approach to defining the leader is by observing the differences between the two and obtaining a general framework for the definition of the Leader (work done by Stodgill, 1948,) e.g. the Leader has x qualities that is universal to all leaders, creating an identity of the leader grounded in qualities/traits. However, as is often the case with contingent induction (it is argued elsewhere of a necessary induction for further information see Kripke, Naming & Necessity), and all contingent traits, it fails to hold as necessary and the traits are discrepant and inconsistent. Also, we find a decline in influence of Leaders with the qualities postulated by Stodgill, over time and change; coming to the conclusion that the qualities are not the necessary component of Leadership. Thus, this approach to leadership loses, as Bales noticed, its explanatory strength in the face of time.

To make matters simpler for the critics, a new dimension to the individualist approach was added: that of the functionality of the leader (Simonto, 1980). This dimension argues that personality traits are not enough to account for the Leader, the situation has an equal amount of strength on the formation of the Leader e.g. the situation demands a person who is excellent at ‘x’, and that person can lead via his/her ‘x’ ability. This adds functionality to the Leadership explanation, but also bringing with it the fundamental importance of the ’situation’ that will cause many problems to the different approaches.

Currently we’re only dealing with the ‘Leader’ as a person and this has massive implications. A study by Lippet and White (1943) brought to light more leader-follower interaction through likability of a particular ‘type’ of leader. They found three distinct ways or manners of Leadership exemplified by the words, Autocratic (aloof, organized, strict and task-oriented; direct approach), Democratic (encourages follower engagement, acts synonymous to a member as opposed to a leader; indirect approach) and finally, Laissez-faire (allows the group to act of its own accord, and is minimally available or engaged). The first two were more task-oriented in distinction to the last; the last is attributed as portraying more closely the situation of a no-leader.

The Collectivist Approach

This is the collectivist attempt at accounting for the Leader; its approach is grounded on the assumption that leadership implies participation in a group, or membership of a group with at least one more element. Directly linking to the previous study, there is a distinction in the likability studies that brings forth a more collectivist approach. The main thing taken forward that lead to collectivist theories was the assumption that: if there is a correlation between likability and Leadership effectiveness, as observed by the three types, then the interaction between leader and follower is essential. Bales (1950), after finding that the democratic was favoured to the Autocratic inferred from the likability distinction between the first two an even bigger distinction, grounded in personality, between the task specialist (brining back the initial formulation of exemplary functionality desired as a leadership quality by the situation) and socio-emotional specialist. The former arises from the assumption of the importance of productivity, or the completion of the group goal. Whereas the latter considered more the interaction between elements and the contribution of elements in the goal; it helped elements feel more engaged with the outcome. (The latter hides assumptions orienting towards Self-Categorization Theory (SCT), and leading to Social Identity Theory, as well as other social psychology theories) Bales’ work was extended by Katz & Khan (1952) which showed the distinction is not fixed, and as such Leaders can aspects of each. Implying that this is not a distinction of personality as much as a distinction of approach; further implying that approach can be altered and mixed.

Staying with the likability angle and as such with the collectivist approach and the leader/follower interaction as the basis for Leadership effectiveness, a previously mentioned element in the individualist approach is added. This is the importance of the situation and the contingency approach, initially working as a critique against the Bales distinction. Fiedler (1967) inferred that there are hierarchical situational factors that affect the Leader’s influence and effectiveness, in order of importance: 1st, leader-member relations, 2nd, task structure, 3rd, position power. The three are put in order of importance and value, the 1st being the most valuable, the latter two less so than the first, and the 2nd more so than the 3rd etc. Fielder inferred that as the situation varies this hierarchy can change, favouring the 2nd more than the 1st etc. This often happens in times where task orientation is the key goal of the group that the leader is a part of, a good example of this is Winston Churchill’s leadership capabilities and influence/effectiveness during the times of War, and his decline during the times of Peace.

The next step is another towards the burial of all Leadership theories; the notion of the follower being a disguised leader, or in the words of Che Guevara: in the end, the people (followers) shall have the last word. This idea is fueled from the supposition that the leader is not without a follower, or one presupposes the other. Thus, there is a conditional relationship between leader and follower. SCT through Hogg and Duck (1997) extends this by postulating that the Leader is an exemplary of the group norms and characteristics, in other words, the man/woman that best shows who or what we are; the prefect so to speak. Thus, without the Follower the Leader is nothing, and the leader is grounded on the follower, showing a reduction of the Leader to the group/follower. Prototypical Leadership approach has strong explanatory grounds for effectiveness, indicating the importance of group identity. The more clear and distinct the group’s identity, and the adherence of the Leader to this identity, the more effective he/she is, and the more likely to be influential. (Fielding and Hogg, 1997)

We find then that SCT’s theory of prototypicality is able to encapsulate almost all aspects of leadership; from effectiveness (via the follower), to traits via the group identity/norms and to the situation likewise via the group norms (although the situation is presupposed and seldom talked about in prototypical leadership) and the group itself. This approach then condenses the leader to the group, in that whatever is of the group will be of the leader; as such the importance is shifted from the Leader to the follower, and subsequently the collection of followers (the group). In this reduction we find that Leadership is after all a matter of the follower or collection of followers; primarily because the leader is not possible without the follower. Thus, crudely speaking, the follower is the true leader and the leader is really just a follower.

Critique

The above are all studies done a posteriori with little to no a priori* attempts, after all Psychology does fancy itself a science and values the strength of empirical evidence in obtaining conclusions regarding theories. The critique I bring forward will attempt to deal with only the presuppositions and the assumptions of the Leader, and in the hope the we will come to some kind of an identity statement for the Leader a priori; however, it is possible to obtain identity statements a posteriori, for example, Water is H2O, (refer to Kripke for further understanding). Although that is altogether too bold as well as too optimistic, we shall try non-the-less; for it is in going too far that we find how far we can go.

The problems with the above theories is that they all attempt at an identity statement through a reduction, that always leaves them presupposing one or more things. We find the trait theory presupposes the situation, then the situation overlooking the importance of the follower/leader distinction and/or interaction, as such not being able to grasp the whole series of events that are necessary for all Leadership. Each theory grasps an aspect but, all of them miss the fundamental notion that Bales caught a glimpse of in his critique of trait theory; the notion of time and the situation.

First we ask what a Leader is; the common sense definition. The initial answer is that a Leader is somebody that leads (a tautology). Yet, that is insufficient because we are just uttering nothing; thus, the next question is: what is presupposed in the notion of ‘leading’? The answer is the opposing word of following; a leader can’t lead without being followed. As such and through this approach we deduce the importance of the leader/follower distinction and more importantly the necessity of one for the other. Leaders and Followers are distinct but at the same time necessary for one another; no leader without follower, no follower without leader (no leading without following etc.). Thus, we find that the Leader presupposes the follower; what was initially observed in the likability experiments and the inference of the three types of leaders.

So far we have: a Leader is somebody that leads, implying that there is somebody that follows; the next question is which came first the leader or the follower? Or is this a perfect self-enclosed circle impenetrable to all other questions? Leading and following implies at least two people, one doing the leading and the other doing the following. In this implication rests a further implication of a group; where a group is defined as two or more people with an equivalent goal/purpose. In this case the goal and purpose is the direction that the leader leads his followers in. We then come to the underlying assumption behind all leader/follower interactions, the assumption of a group. A group comes with its own presuppositions: the group norm, a number of similar people/elements and a purpose. Prototypical leadership theory rests on this presupposition, that Leaders and followers are a group.

Thus, we can reduce the leader down even further, to the group and the group norms. Although Leaders have influence over group norms and changes within the group or to the group, in the end, power of numbers guarantees that the group (followers and Leaders alike) decides the power of the Leader. Thus, as Che Guevara realised, it is the followers that decide the leader, and the followers are the bigger part of the group (in so far as leader < follower). The only problem however arises when there is only one follower, and thus, only one person being lead, by another who is likewise a single person. In the end, the relationship between the two is necessary; one is needed for the other. The real question would be, who does the relationship favour; the real answer is none, but we know that without leaders there are no followers, without followers there are no leaders. We know however, that the leader can be eliminated and a new one can be appointed from the followers, but the followers can’t be eliminated because then the leader is nothing (if and only if there is a single leader as opposed to a tribunal). The assumption underlying this is that there are more followers than leaders, and under these conditions the followers are in favour due to their numbers; hence Che Guevara’s notion of leadership. However, under the anomalous condition of only one leader and only one follower, this becomes an issue because conflict between the two makes it difficult to arrive at an understanding of what can occur. It would lead to relying on other theories to describe the dynamics behind dominance and submission that is assumed to be the cornerstone of all interactions between two people, and leadership and followership in groups with only two elements. Thus, it would make things easier for our current purposes to remove this anomalous situation from our critique and deal with larger groups.

There is a further relationship between the leader/follower distinction, one arising from the presupposition of the necessity for a group (excluding the anomaly) with its norms, elements and goal. This is the presupposition of a situation; a group implies a direction, a goal, and as such the goal brings with it a situation in response. A goal is always in response to a situation; as such the situation in this case is irreducible. Before this, we have to ask some questions: if the group decides what and who the leader is, can we eliminate the leader/follower distinction altogether and deal with the group; can we reduce the leader to the group? If we reduced the leader (and follower) to the group, then we have a problem of having to account for group changes outside and beyond inner-group dynamics and this would cause some issues. We even have to account for how the group came to be if we are to eliminate and reduce the elements to the group; we would have to appeal to contingency. We would not be able to account for influence and change originating from within, or even from without, for we have reduced all possibilities of influence when we reduced the elements. It would seem that we have the need for another component, one that was touched upon by Bales, but Bales did not realize the importance of it. All groups and elements alike are bound by a situation, a time, a history, a constitution and temporality in which they find themselves in. What is the situation? It is a broad term indeed, and hard to pin point. The situation would be the history underlying the formation of the group, it would be the reason why the elements have the commonality that lead to their forming a group. It would encapsulate the goal of the group and as such the hierarchical model in Fiedler would also be reduced, for changes in the hierarchy can only arise from a situation. The situation is the set of conditions or state of affairs preceding that lead to the formation of the group with its elements, or the changes thereof. Always presupposed in any given relationship between human beings, and thus under this category fall the leader and follower, is the concrete situation. The group then presupposes a situation, a temporality, a moment in time that is preceded by a past that possibly worked as a prerequisite for the formation of the group. In a sense then we can say that the leader is always presupposed in, and preceded by, the situation; but likewise the leader can cause the situation, and thus cause the next leader.

To sum up, we obtained the follower from the leader, and established a necessary relationship between the two. Then we found that this could not account for certain aspects and inferred the group as the presupposition over this relationship. Further, we couldn’t reduce or account fully for dynamics between follower and leader in a group to the group itself without having an element that brought with it time, and as such be able to account for change. Thus, we concluded that the situation is the primary component that holds weight over the group, with its dynamics, goals and elements – elements here encapsulating the Leader and Follower. As such there is a transition from Leader to Situation, then from Situation to Leader, and so on regressively with time; e.g. the reasons why an Autocratic Leader may be more favoured in a situation of War, and a Democratic in a situation of Peace etc. a real example would be the ineffectiveness of Winston Churchill during peace, and Mahatma Gandhi during war. We know not which came first for that is an ontological question and beyond our scope as well as our intention. The moment we try to grasp one however, we lose all the others that preceded it and could have caused it. As such we miss all the primary causes or reasons for a particular Leader and Situation at a particular time. Say we have Leader x3, and we infer Situation x3, but in doing so we have already lost the Leaders and Situations x2 to x0 that preceded and could have caused them, as such missing vital information for understanding. However, regardless of our inability to account for pretty much anything and explain a current state of affairs because of the others that preceded and could have caused them; this model still serves to describe the interplay pretty well. We can skip all metaphysical questioning and likewise lose the hope of getting answers to why questions and as such be able to explain fully, but simply we can just describe and hope that this is sufficient for our predictions and inferences. The explanatory strength of a particular theory may never be absolute but it serves its job pretty well on the current circumstances, and can predict sufficiently well. Even if it is not what the theory claims to offer, what it offers is good enough for utility.

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*A priori literally means ‘before experience’, a posteriori means ‘after experience’.